Perez v New York City Transit Authority
Categories
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Personal injury and motor vehicle negligence involving an Access-A-Ride paratransit vehicle whose driver opened a door into moving traffic.
The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied defendant Steven Cymbalsky's motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and all cross-claims against him.
The Appellate Division reversed the order insofar as appealed from and granted Cymbalsky summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and all cross-claims against him.
The appellate court held that Cymbalsky established he was not at fault. The evidence showed that Peter L. Brown opened the Access-A-Ride vehicle's driver-side door into moving traffic when it was not reasonably safe to do so, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1214 [no person shall open a vehicle door on the side available to moving traffic unless it is reasonably safe and without interfering with traffic, and no person shall leave such a door open longer than necessary to load or unload passengers]. Deposition testimony and vehicle damage demonstrated that the collision occurred almost immediately after the door was opened, while Cymbalsky was traveling below the speed limit, and the opposing parties failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Background
Perez was a passenger in an Access-A-Ride vehicle driven by Peter L. Brown. After Brown parked, he opened the driver-side door, which struck a vehicle being driven by Steven Cymbalsky. Perez then sued Brown, the New York City Transit Authority, Maggies Paratransit Corp., and Cymbalsky for personal injuries allegedly arising from the incident.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied Cymbalsky's motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the amended complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against him.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed insofar as appealed from and granted Cymbalsky's motion. The court found that Cymbalsky's deposition testimony that he was traveling 15 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone, Perez's testimony that the impact occurred 'like a second' after the door opened, and the damage pattern to Cymbalsky's vehicle established that Brown's unsafe opening of the door was the proximate cause of the collision and that Cymbalsky was free from fault.
Legal Significance
This decision underscores that a defendant seeking summary judgment in a negligence action must show he or she was free from fault, even where there may be multiple proximate causes. It also reinforces that opening a vehicle door into moving traffic in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1214 can constitute negligence as a matter of law when the record shows the opening was unsafe and directly caused the collision.
A passing driver may obtain summary judgment when the undisputed evidence shows that another driver suddenly opened a vehicle door into traffic in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1214, and the opponents cannot raise a factual issue that the passing driver contributed to the accident.