S. F., etc., et al. v. Eliezer Friedman, et al.; Jacob Indig (third-party defendant-respondent)
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Civil procedure—whether plaintiffs may amend to add a third-party defendant as a direct defendant after the statute of limitations based on relation-back once the third-party defendant was impleaded before the limitations period expired.
Denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint to add third-party defendant Jacob Indig as a direct defendant.
The denial of leave to amend to add Indig as a direct defendant.
Under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) 3025(b) [leave to amend or supplement a pleading shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just], mere lateness and the prospect of greater liability do not constitute prejudice. Because Indig was impleaded before the statute of limitations expired, had actual notice, and actively participated in discovery, plaintiffs’ direct claims relate back under Duffy v Horton Mem. Hosp., and no cognizable prejudice was shown.
Background
In May 2013, the infant plaintiff was allegedly injured when a vehicle owned by Benjamin Friedman and operated by Eliezer Friedman struck him while he was riding a bicycle. The infant and his father sued in April 2017. In August 2020, defendants impleaded Jacob Indig for contribution, alleging the infant was a passenger on a bicycle operated by Indig. In December 2022, plaintiffs moved to amend to add Indig as a direct defendant. The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied that branch of the motion in a July 7, 2023 order.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied plaintiffs’ request to add Indig as a direct defendant, effectively refusing leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint.
Appellate Division Reversal
Reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and granted leave to amend to add Indig as a direct defendant. The court applied CPLR 3025(b) [leave to amend shall be freely given] and the relation-back doctrine as articulated in Duffy v Horton Mem. Hosp., noting Indig was impleaded before the limitations period ran, had actual notice of the claims and theories, engaged in discovery, and thus could not demonstrate significant prejudice. The court emphasized that mere exposure to direct liability and the passage of time do not constitute legal prejudice.
Legal Significance
Reaffirms that when a third-party defendant is impleaded before the statute of limitations expires, plaintiffs may later assert direct claims that relate back to the third-party complaint’s service date, provided no significant prejudice is shown. It underscores the liberal amendment policy of CPLR 3025(b) [leave to amend shall be freely given] and clarifies that active participation by the third-party defendant undermines claims of prejudice.
Leave to amend to add an impleaded third-party defendant as a direct defendant should be freely granted and will relate back when the third-party defendant had timely notice and has actively defended the case; mere lateness or increased exposure to liability is not prejudice.