Dusaj v. Waterbridge Court Square Holdings, LLC
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Personal injury stemming from an elevator malfunction at a commercial property; procedural issue concerning vacatur of a default judgment under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) 5015(a)(1) [relief from a judgment or order based on excusable default; movant must show a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense].
The Supreme Court, Queens County granted the defendant’s motion to vacate the order that had granted plaintiff’s unopposed motion for a default judgment.
The order dated March 28, 2023 vacating the plaintiff’s default judgment order (dated January 25, 2022).
The defendant failed to offer a reasonable excuse for its default: merely forwarding the complaint to a lessee and assuming the lessee would defend was unreasonable; it ignored a September 10, 2021 default notice; and it offered no explanation for waiting more than three months after service of notice of entry of the default order before acting. Without a reasonable excuse, the court need not reach whether a meritorious defense exists.
Background
Plaintiff alleged injuries from a July 2018 elevator malfunction in a building owned by Waterbridge Court Square Holdings, LLC. Plaintiff commenced the action in March 2021. Despite service of the summons and complaint, Waterbridge did not appear or answer. Plaintiff moved for a default judgment, which the Supreme Court granted on January 25, 2022. In September 2022, Waterbridge moved under CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate that order, asserting it believed the building’s lessee was handling the defense because Waterbridge had forwarded the complaint.
Lower Court Decision
By order dated March 28, 2023, the Supreme Court, Queens County granted Waterbridge’s CPLR 5015(a)(1) motion and vacated the January 25, 2022 default judgment order.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division reversed, with costs, and denied Waterbridge’s CPLR 5015(a)(1) motion. The court held Waterbridge’s excuse was unreasonable because it simply forwarded the complaint to a lessee and assumed the lessee would defend, it failed to address plaintiff’s September 10, 2021 default-notice letter, and it did not explain a more-than-three-month delay after service of notice of entry of the default order. Having failed to provide a reasonable excuse, there was no need to consider a potentially meritorious defense.
Legal Significance
Reaffirms that under CPLR 5015(a)(1), a movant must first demonstrate a reasonable excuse before a court considers any meritorious defense. Reliance on another entity (such as a lessee) to defend an action, without more, is not a reasonable excuse, and unexplained delays after notice of entry weigh against vacatur.
Forwarding pleadings to a lessee or third party does not excuse a party’s failure to appear; absent a concrete, reasonable excuse for default, courts will not vacate a default judgment under CPLR 5015(a)(1).