People v. Alexander
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Criminal law—drug offenses; scope of automatic discovery for police disciplinary records and sentencing concurrency.
After a jury trial, the County Court convicted Alexander of multiple third- and fifth-degree controlled substance offenses, limited automatic disclosure of Internal Affairs Bureau files to substantiated or unsubstantiated allegations, declined to dismiss possession counts as lesser-included of sale, and imposed partly consecutive sentences yielding a 16-year aggregate term.
Only the sentencing structure: the Appellate Division directed counts 3 and 4 to run concurrently with the remaining counts, reducing the aggregate term from 16 years to 8 years.
As a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, the consecutive terms on counts 3 and 4 were deemed excessive; all other claims were rejected, including discovery (CPL 245.20[1][k][iv] [automatic disclosure of certain impeachment materials, including law enforcement disciplinary records]), preservation (CPL 470.05[2] [preservation requirement for appellate review]), lesser-included (CPL 300.40[3][a] [addresses submission and dismissal of inclusory concurrent counts]), sufficiency/weight (CPL 470.15[5] [authority for weight-of-evidence review in intermediate appellate courts]), and ineffective assistance.
Background
Alexander was charged in Suffolk County with two counts of third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance, three counts of third-degree criminal possession, and two counts of fifth-degree criminal possession. A jury found him guilty on all charged counts. As a second felony offender, he received determinate terms of eight years (with three years of postrelease supervision) on counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and four years (with two years of postrelease supervision) on counts 7 and 9. The court ran counts 1, 2, 5, 7, and 9 concurrently, counts 3 and 4 concurrently with each other, but consecutive to the first group, producing a 16-year aggregate sentence.
Lower Court Decision
The County Court limited automatic disclosure of Internal Affairs Bureau files to substantiated or unsubstantiated allegations, excluded exonerated or unfounded allegations from automatic disclosure, denied dismissal of third-degree possession counts as lesser-included of third-degree sale, and imposed partly consecutive sentences that resulted in a 16-year aggregate term.
Appellate Division Reversal
Modified only the sentence: counts 3 and 4 shall run concurrently with counts 1, 2, 5, 7, and 9, reducing the aggregate term to eight years. The court otherwise affirmed, holding that: (1) discovery claims were partly unpreserved (CPL 470.05[2] [preservation requirement for appellate review]) and, in any event, exonerated or unfounded Internal Affairs Bureau allegations are not subject to automatic disclosure (CPL 245.20[1][k][iv] [automatic disclosure of certain impeachment materials, including law enforcement disciplinary records]); (2) third-degree possession is not a lesser-included offense of third-degree sale (CPL 300.40[3][a] [addresses submission and dismissal of inclusory concurrent counts]); (3) the evidence was legally sufficient and the verdict not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15[5] [authority for weight-of-evidence review in intermediate appellate courts]); and (4) defendant received effective assistance of counsel under Strickland.
Legal Significance
Reaffirms that exonerated or unfounded police disciplinary allegations are outside automatic discovery under CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv); clarifies that third-degree possession is not a lesser-included of third-degree sale under CPL 300.40(3)(a); and demonstrates the Appellate Division’s power to modify consecutive sentences as excessive in the interest of justice.
On a drug-conviction appeal, most challenges failed, but the Appellate Division reduced the aggregate sentence by making all terms concurrent; exonerated/unfounded Internal Affairs files are not automatically discoverable, and possession and sale charges are not inclusory of each other.