Cannon v H&L Contracting, LLC
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Maritime/construction injury on a barge used in bridge repair and the scope of employer immunity and vessel negligence under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).
The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on liability.
The Appellate Division reversed the denial of the defendant’s motion and granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) (33 USC § 901 et seq.) [federal workers' compensation benefits; exclusive remedy against employer], and § 905(b) [permits negligence claims against a vessel], a dual-capacity employer-vessel owner is liable only for breaches in its capacity as vessel owner. The January 3 accident arose from employer responsibilities (not vessel negligence), and the January 11 fall occurred while stepping from a concrete pile cap (a pier—an extension of land) to shore, for which the vessel owner bears no liability under general maritime law.
Background
Plaintiff James Cannon, employed by H&L Contracting, worked on repairing the Whitestone Bridge fender system from a barge owned by H&L. On January 3, 2018, he allegedly slipped from a bent step on an excavator and fell into an uncovered hole in a crane mat on the barge. On January 11, 2018, after the floating dock used for access was no longer present, a tug pushed the barge to a concrete pile cap; after disembarking, climbing a ladder, and walking about 30 feet along the pile cap, Cannon attempted to cross a two-to-three-foot gap to shore and fell.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied H&L’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied Cannon’s cross-motion for summary judgment on liability as to both incidents.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division held the barge is a vessel but concluded H&L, as a dual-capacity defendant, was not liable in vessel negligence for the January 3 accident because the unsafe condition (bent step/uncovered crane mat hole) implicated H&L’s role as employer, not vessel owner, under 33 USC § 905(b). As to January 11, the court held the plaintiff fell while moving from a concrete pile cap (part of the pier and thus an extension of land) to shore, for which the vessel owner has no liability under general maritime law. The court therefore reversed insofar as appealed from and granted H&L summary judgment dismissing the complaint in full, and affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s cross-motion on liability. One bill of costs was awarded to H&L.
Legal Significance
Clarifies application of the LHWCA dual-capacity doctrine in New York: employer immunity bars claims rooted in employer functions, and § 905(b) vessel negligence applies only to conduct in the owner’s vessel capacity. Reinforces the land-extension doctrine that piers and pile caps are extensions of land, limiting vessel-owner liability where the injury occurs landward of the vessel (and where no vessel appurtenance provides access).
An employer that also owns the vessel is not liable in vessel negligence under LHWCA § 905(b) for workplace conditions arising from employer functions, and injuries occurring on a pier or pile cap—extensions of land—fall outside vessel-owner liability.