The People of the State of New York v. Dajahnya Little
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Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Criminal law appeal involving the validity of an appeal waiver, denial of youthful offender treatment, sentence severity, and whether mandatory surcharges and fees should be waived.
Monroe County Court accepted defendant's guilty plea to attempted gang assault in the first degree under Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.07 [criminal attempt; gang assault in the first degree], denied youthful offender status, and imposed a determinate prison sentence of five years plus five years of postrelease supervision, along with mandatory surcharge and fees.
Nothing was overturned; the judgment was affirmed.
The Appellate Division held that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal, which barred review of the youthful offender ruling, the sentence severity claim, and the challenge to the surcharge and fees. The court also noted that the fee-waiver claim under CPL 420.35 (2-a) [authorizes waiver of certain mandatory surcharges and fees for qualifying young defendants or in the interests of justice] was unpreserved.
Background
Defendant, who was 16 years old at the time of the offense, participated with others in a violent attack on a 14-year-old victim. According to the dissent's factual summary, the group repeatedly punched, kicked, and stomped the victim and ran over the victim with a car. The victim was left unconscious and suffered a traumatic brain injury, a lacerated liver, a fractured spine, a broken leg, and multiple broken ribs. Defendant later pleaded guilty to attempted gang assault in the first degree.
Lower Court Decision
County Court denied youthful offender status and, consistent with the plea agreement, sentenced defendant to a determinate term of five years' incarceration followed by five years' postrelease supervision. The court also imposed a $300 mandatory surcharge, a $25 crime victim assistance fee, and a $50 deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) databank fee.
Appellate Division Reversal
There was no reversal. The majority affirmed in full, concluding that the oral colloquy and written waiver established a valid appeal waiver under the totality of the circumstances. Based on that waiver, the court held that review of the youthful offender determination, the harshness of the sentence, and the surcharge-and-fee challenge was foreclosed. Two justices dissented in part, reasoning that the Appellate Division retained interest-of-justice authority to vacate the surcharge and fees despite the waiver and would have modified the judgment to remove them.
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that a valid waiver of the right to appeal can preclude appellate review of challenges to youthful offender denial, sentence severity, and claims seeking waiver of mandatory financial assessments. At the same time, the partial dissent highlights an unresolved tension: even where an appeal waiver exists, the Appellate Division may still possess independent interest-of-justice authority under CPL 420.35 (2-a) to waive surcharges and fees for young defendants when financial obligations would hinder reintegration.
Because defendant's appeal waiver was upheld as knowing and voluntary, the Fourth Department left her conviction, sentence, and financial obligations intact, despite a dissent that would have used the court's interest-of-justice power to vacate the surcharge and fees for this youthful defendant.