AG1 Doe v. George Morris
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Child sexual abuse claims in youth/equestrian sports; constitutionality of the Child Victims Act (CVA) revival window and proper tort theories against an alleged abuser.
Supreme Court (New York County) denied George Morris's CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7) motion [rule allowing pre-answer dismissal for, among other things, statute of limitations (a)(5) and failure to state a cause of action (a)(7)], permitting sexual battery and negligence claims to proceed.
Only the negligence cause of action against Morris was dismissed; the sexual battery claim was allowed to proceed; a separate appeal from an October 1, 2024 order was dismissed as abandoned.
CPLR 214-g [revival statute for civil claims arising out of child sexual abuse] is constitutional on its face and as applied; equal protection and due process challenges fail. The negligence claim, premised on the same conduct as the alleged sexual battery, is not cognizable because New York recognizes no 'negligent assault.'
Background
Plaintiff AG1 Doe alleges that George Morris sexually abused him more than 40 years ago when plaintiff was a minor in the equestrian context. After enactment of the Child Victims Act (CVA), CPLR 214-g, plaintiff filed suit asserting sexual battery and negligence. Morris moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7), arguing the claims were time-barred and inadequately pleaded and that the revival statute was unconstitutional.
Lower Court Decision
The trial court denied Morris's motion, holding that the CVA revival statute permitted the action to proceed and that the pleadings sufficiently stated claims for sexual battery and negligence.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division modified to dismiss the negligence claim against Morris because it duplicates an intentional tort and New York does not recognize negligent assault (citing Trott v Merit Dept. Store). It otherwise affirmed denial of dismissal of the sexual battery claim, upholding the CVA against facial and as-applied due process and equal protection challenges (citing Forbes and Matarazzo). The separate appeal from an October 1, 2024 order was dismissed as abandoned.
Legal Significance
Reaffirms across departments that CPLR 214-g is a constitutional, reasonable legislative response to the unique reporting dynamics of child sexual abuse, and clarifies that plaintiffs cannot repackage alleged intentional sexual assaults as negligence claims against the alleged perpetrator.
Under the Child Victims Act (CVA), CPLR 214-g, survivors may sue alleged abusers for intentional torts such as sexual battery even decades later; however, negligence claims based on the same intentional conduct against the alleged abuser will be dismissed as a matter of law.