Attorneys and Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant Ruth Reyes
Attorneys: Michael A. Serpico

Defendants-Respondents Kevin R. Chapman and others
Attorneys: Ira E. Goldstein, Iryna S. Krauchanka, Kevin G. Faley

Brief Summary

Issue

Motor vehicle personal injury litigation concerning the serious-injury threshold under Insurance Law § 5102(d) [defines serious injury, including permanent consequential limitation of use, significant limitation of use, and the applicable 90/180-day category].

Lower Court Held

The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that Reyes did not sustain a serious injury caused by the accident.

Disposition

The appellate court reversed the April 1, 2025 order, with costs, and denied the defendants' summary judgment motion.

Why

The defendants failed to meet their initial burden of establishing the absence of a qualifying serious injury or accident-related causation. Their expert documented significant range-of-motion limitations without adequately substantiating her opinion that those limitations were voluntary, and their submissions did not eliminate factual issues concerning the 90/180-day claim.

Background

Ruth Reyes alleged that she sustained injuries to her left shoulder and the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine in a collision between a vehicle in which she was a passenger and the defendants' vehicle. She commenced a personal injury action, and the defendants sought summary judgment based on the statutory serious-injury threshold.

Lower Court Decision

By order dated April 1, 2025, Justice James F. Quinn of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint. Reyes appealed.

Appellate Division Reversal

The appellate court unanimously reversed. The defendants failed to submit competent medical evidence establishing that Reyes did not sustain a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories. Their expert found significant limitations in the left shoulder and cervical and thoracolumbar spine but inadequately explained and substantiated her conclusion that those limitations were voluntary. The defendants also failed to eliminate triable issues concerning the 90/180-day category under Insurance Law former § 5102(d), applicable when the action commenced, or to establish that the claimed shoulder and spinal injuries were unrelated to the accident. Because the defendants did not satisfy their initial burden, the court did not assess the sufficiency of Reyes's opposition.

Legal Significance

A defendant seeking summary judgment on the serious-injury threshold must first present competent evidence addressing the asserted injury categories and any claimed lack of causation. An expert's inadequately substantiated attribution of documented significant limitations to voluntary restriction does not satisfy that burden. If the moving defendants fail to make their initial showing, the motion must be denied regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition.

🔑 Key Takeaway

The defendants' failure to establish entitlement to judgment required denial of their motion. The reversal permits Reyes's action to proceed but does not determine that she sustained a statutory serious injury or establish liability.